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This article investigates signaling and screening roles of wage offers in
a single-play matching model with two-sided unobservable characteristics.
It generates the following predictions as matching equilibrium outcomes:
(i) ‘‘good’’ jobs offer premia if ‘‘high-quality’’ worker population is large;
(ii) ‘‘bad’’ jobs pay compensating differentials if the proportion of ‘‘good’’ jobs
to ‘‘low-quality’’ workers is large; (iii) all firms may offer a pooling wage in
markets dominated by ‘‘high-quality’’ workers and firms; or (iv) Gresham’s
Law prevails: ‘‘good’’ types withdraw if ‘‘bad’’ types dominate the population.
The screening/signaling motive thus has the potential of explaining a variety of
wage patterns.
1. INTRODUCTION
Appropriate job–worker matching occurs to the extent that the parties’ relevant
characteristics are common knowledge, that is, if the existing economic institutions
allow for full screening and signaling before the transaction takes place. Interviews
and tests are screening devices, whereas the verifiable items in an applicant’s CV are
signals. Firms can also signal job characteristics through ads, size, employees, and
reputation. Despite these instruments, in practice a firm’s information about job-
relevant characteristics of its applicants is never perfect, and a worker is never
certain as to the attributes of the jobs he/she is offered. The matching problem is
therefore a potential source of economy-wide inefficiency.
This article concentrates on one instrument, the offer wage, and investigates its
impact on matching efficiency. What signaling and/or screening functions can wage
offers perform when nonwage instruments are not available or only partially succeed
in transmitting the relevant information?2 This question is addressed in a matching
model of a large job market populated by observationally indistinguishable, het-
erogeneous firms and workers. Heterogeneity is introduced in the simplest way, by
assuming two basic types of firms and workers, where one type has an advantage
* Manuscript received June 1999; revised December 1999.
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over the other: firms prefer good-quality workers and workers prefer firms with
better attributes, wages being equal. However, good-quality workers are much more
productive in firms with better attributes; hence, efficiency requires firms and
workers of the same type be matched. The approach in this article differs in that the
process of matching is explicitly modeled as a noncooperative game where firms
offer wages and workers respond with their application decisions. The matching
probability at a given wage offer is obtained endogenously, as a feature of the
equilibrium outcome.3
This simple model generates a rich class of predictions in the form of matching
equilibria, relating wage offers and matching efficiency to the distribution of unob-
servable characteristics: if the proportion of ‘‘good’’ firms to ‘‘bad’’ workers is large,
perfect matching occurs through wage offers that do both signaling and screening. In
another equilibrium, wages signal firm types but do only partial screening if the
good-worker population is sufficiently large. Both firm types offer the same wage in
equilibrium if the market is predominantly populated by good workers and good
firms. Other equilibria exhibit Gresham’s Law in the job market: pessimistic workers
and firms of the good type withdraw and take their outside options. Because search is
assumed to be costless, any inefficiency of the matching equilibrium outcome is due
solely to the two-sided information problem.
Below, I briefly relate the article’s predictions to the literature and relegate a more
detailed discussion to Section 4. The wage determination literature provides a
number of theories explaining observed wage patterns, sources of inter- and intra-
industry wage differentials, sizes of compensating differentials and instances where
they are paid, and why wages may exceed workers’ opportunity costs. The impli-
cations derived in this article complement existing explanations for the above phe-
nomena, some of which are termed ‘‘anomalies.’’4 Because the model is a one-shot
matching game, these implications should be relevant especially in the short run.
Efficiency wage and agency models of employment relationships show that paying
more than the apparent going wage may deliver a net productivity gain.5 Such a
strategy can also sort workers into firms that have differential observed compensa-
tions.6 The explanation in this article is based on unobservable characteristics: the
motive of signaling unobserved firm attributes alone can generate a wage differen-
tial. This equilibrium outcome arises if the population of good-quality workers is
relatively large, that is, if a desirable firm attribute can be signaled through a wage
differential at a reasonable cost. The signaling motive is a plausible explanation for
many observed intraindustry wage differentials, such as the substantial annual wage
3 The standard approach to modeling matching in labor markets (see Masters, 1999; Coles, 1999
and the references therein) is to postulate an exogenous random matching process.
4 See Thaler (1989), who reports interesting real-life examples of substantially different wage
offers for similar jobs and discusses the theoretical explanations for interindustry wage differentials.
5 See, for instance, Lazear (1979) and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) for theories generating these
predictions, and Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Leonard (1990) for their tests.
6 The classic article by Roy (1951) espouses this view. Examples of more recent treatments are
Cain (1976) and Bulow and Summers (1986).
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differential an MBA graduate may receive from two similar jobs in the same city
(which is reported in Thaler, 1989).
Compensating differentials play an important role in wage determination
when jobs differ with respect to observable attributes. The theory (see Rosen,
1986) stipulates premia should be paid according to the perceived difficulty of
the job, but there seems no reason why such premia should be paid when
workers and jobs are observationally indistinguishable. I show that the pre-
diction of the theory of compensating differentials continues to hold under
two-sided incomplete information provided that the market is largely populated
by ‘‘good’’ jobs and ‘‘bad’’ workers. A matching equilibrium exists in which
wage offers perform full signaling and screening: jobs with undesirable
attributes pay a premium, matching ‘‘good’’ firms and workers at a lower wage
than ‘‘bad’’ firms and workers.7 This is the only outcome that efficient labor
allocation obtains in the present model. The predictions summarized above
suggest that the motive of signaling job attributes or screening for worker
characteristics through wage offers has the potential of explaining a variety of
short-run wage patterns in markets where agents’ characteristics are not fully
observable.
The article is organized as follows: The next section describes the matching model
and its equilibrium concept. Section 3 presents the equilibrium outcomes and
Section 4 provides a summary and discussion of results. All proofs are gathered in
the Appendix.
2. THE MODEL
Consider a sector of the economy with large populations of firms and workers, of
measure M and N, respectively. Each worker has one unit of indivisible labor for
sale, and each firm seeks to buy one unit of labor. There are two possible types of
firms (H and L) and workers (h and l). A measure qM ((1ÿ q)M) of firms are of type
H (L), and a measure pN ((1ÿ p)N) of workers are of type h (l). Though p and q are
common knowledge, types are privately known.
All firms have the same reservation profit normalized to zero. The profit of a
type-j firm paying the wage w to a type-i worker is Rj(i)ÿ w. I assume that
h-workers have desirable general abilities that make them more productive than
l-workers in both types of firms: RH(h) > RH(l) and RL(h) > RL(l). Furthermore,
h-workers are much more productive in H-firms: RH(h) > RL(h). To exemplify,
H-jobs may be providing better working conditions or be more flexible, which may
considerably increase h-workers’ productivity. L-jobs may involve rather routine
tasks where general abilities matter less, which would make l-workers more pro-
ductive in L-jobs than H-jobs: RL(l) > RH(l). Thus, the following ranking of
productivities is assumed:
7 See Bac (2000) for a different, multiperiod model in which the firm has monopsony power and
‘‘good’’ workers (temporarily) accept wages lower than their outside options and signal their types on
the job.
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RH(l) < RL(l) < RL(h) < RH(h)(A1)
The utility function of a type-i worker who works in a type-j firm is denoted
ui(w, j) and is strictly increasing in w. All workers have the same reservation utility
u,8 with matching preferences similar to (A1): given the wage w, all workers prefer
employment in H-firms; that is, ui(w, H) > ui(w, L), i  l, h. Furthermore, h-
workers perceive a great difference between the two job attributes. For example,
the routine tasks or bad working conditions of L-firms may have a more frustra-
ting effect on creative and high-ability workers; that is, for a given wage,
uh(w, L) < ul(w, L). Therefore, under complete information h-workers must be paid
a higher wage than l-workers to accept an L-job. Conversely, the good attributes of
H-jobs would suit h-workers much better than l-workers, and given the wage w,
h-workers would derive a greater utility from employment in H-firms:
uh(w, H) > ul(w, H). Therefore, given that their reservation utility is the same, h-
workers would accept working in H-firms for a lower wage than l-workers. To
combine these assumptions, for any wage w;9
uh(w, L) < ul(w, L) < ul(w, H) < uh(w, H)(A2)
The technology and preference assumptions (A1) and (A2) generate a rich class of
equilibria in the matching game described below. Using (A2), four minimal wage
levels can be defined through the following equalities:
uh(wh, L)  uh(wh, H)  ul(wl, L)  ul(wl, H)  u(1)
The wage wi makes type-i workers indifferent between working in L-firms and taking
their outside option. Similarly, the minimum wage that a type-i worker would accept
from an H-firm is wi. Since both worker types prefer H-jobs, wi > wi; that is, under
complete information a compensating wage differential is required to have the type-i
worker accept the L-job instead of the H-job. By (A2), this compensation should be
relatively large for h-workers.
Finally, I make a simplifying assumption according to which there are gains from
matching between firms and workers of the same type, but for i 6 j, the total surplus
from a jÿ i matching is negative:
RH(h) > wh, RL(l) > wl and RH(l) < wl, RL(h) < wh(A3)
Thus, incomplete information may have serious inefficiency consequences because
l-workers would like to convince firms that they are of type h, while L-firms will try
to conceal their types in order to attract h-workers. Assumption (A3) implies that
8 Though this is a strong assumption (because workers with better general abilities may have
better outside options), it is qualitatively inconsequential to our results provided that the surplus
from an H ÿ h matching remains positive and h-workers’ reservation utility is not too high relative to
l-workers.
9 Such interpersonal utility comparisons are inevitable in this context. Firms must know how
exactly the two worker types trade off wages for job attributes. For instance, a firm posting a wage
offer has to form expectations about the types of its prospective applicants, the lowest wage that
would signal an H-firm and be rejected by l-workers but accepted by h-workers, whether a wage offer
would signal no information and be accepted by both types of workers, and so on.
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h-workers would prefer taking their outside options if H-firms withdraw from the
market, and similarly, that it is optimal for H-firms to shut down if only l-workers are
seeking jobs.10 It is also immediately evident that the usual ‘‘single crossing
property’’ (commonly assumed in signaling models) does not apply here. Only one
instrument is available for conveying type information: offer wages for the firms and
acceptance decisions for the workers. These features stem from my objective to focus
exclusively on the informational role of wage offers, their signaling and screening
functions in a matching model.
The job market operates through the following stages: It opens with simul-
taneous wage announcements by the firms. The strategy of firm m of type j is
to post one vacancy and a wage wmj  0,11 which remains fixed during the
matching process. On the basis of these offers, workers revise their beliefs
about the types of firms. A system of beliefs generated by these offers is
denoted {q^}, mapping each possible wage offer into the interval [0, 1]. A type-i
worker’s decision problem consists of determining an acceptance list ji that
ranks the firms according to the expected utilities corresponding to their offers.
The firm offering the highest expected utility is placed on top, followed by the
second-best offer and so on. All offers that yield an expected utility less than
u are rejected, and those yielding the same expected utility are successively but
randomly ranked. With their acceptance list in hand, workers meet firms,
starting from their first-best choice. This process is assumed to be costless.12
A system of beliefs about the types of applicants is denoted {p^}, mapping the
set of all possible offers that receive an application into the interval [0, 1]. If
two or more workers apply simultaneously to the same job, the firm randomly
chooses one and the couple withdraws from the market. Workers who have not
been able to meet, or if they meet, not been chosen by, their first-best choice,
continue to search according to their acceptance lists. If a worker exhausts his
list he remains unemployed and receives u. A firm that meets no applicants
shuts down.13
The expected profit of a type-j firm can be written as
vj  aj[p^Rj(h) (1ÿ p^)Rj(l)ÿ wj]
where aj denotes the probability that the offer wj attracts at least one applicant
and p^ is the revised probability that the worker (selected among the applicants) is
10 Proposition 6 describes such an equilibrium outcome.
11 The superscript m will be dropped when all type-j firms make the same offer.
12 This, of course, is a simplification. A side benefit of the costless search assumption is that it
leaves the two-sided information problem as the sole source of equilibrium market inefficiency, if
any.
13 Weiss (1990, pp. 35–41) describes a similar matching process with identical firms and
heterogeneous workers: each firm announces a wage and a number of jobs. Firms choose randomly
among applicants if the number of applicants exceeds posted jobs. However, workers in Weiss’
model can make only one application; hence, weigh wages against acceptance probabilities.
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of type h. I assume that if a measure f of firms make an offer that attracts a
measure g of workers, each of these f -firms meets a g-worker with probability
min{1, g=f }.14
The strategies and systems of beliefs ({wj }, {j

i }, {p^}, {q^}) must constitute a
matching equilibrium, essentially a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with two rather
natural restrictions on belief systems (see the Appendix for their formal statements).
The first condition is in the spirit of the Cho–Kreps (1987) Intuitive Criterion. If
there is an out-of-equilibrium wage offer w0 that a type-i firm would never make,
while the other type j would benefit if it so convinces the workers that this offer
comes from a j-firm, then the workers must put probability zero on type i when they
receive the offer w0. This condition rules out equilibria in which all firms make the
same offer, supported by beliefs ‘‘q^ < 1 for w 2 (RL(h), RH(h)]’’ because such an
offer can only come from an H-firm.
The second condition is that workers’ beliefs should not stop an individual firm
bidding up the wage if it is in its own interest to do so. This condition allows for
Bertrand-type competition and will have bite whenever equilibria involve a < 1, that
is, whenever firms expect meeting a worker with probability less than one. With
beliefs unchanged at the right neighborhood of an equilibrium offer, workers will
place the deviant offer wj   above wj in their acceptance lists; hence, this firm can
attract a larger number of applicants. Note that the firm deviating to a slightly higher
offer cannot expect to attract workers with better (unobservable) qualities because
higher offers would be accepted by both worker types, which should leave the firm’s
beliefs about its applicants unchanged. Except in the range [wh, wl, any offer
accepted by h-workers is also accepted by l-workers, and no wage lower than wh is
accepted by any worker. Thus, a firm posting the deviant (out-of-equilibrium) wage
w0 2 [wh, wl must be convinced that any applicant is of type h.
For the rest of the article equilibrium refers to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium that
survives these conditions. As the workers’ strategies will be rather transparent, hence
as the firms’ process of updating their beliefs will be relatively straightforward, I will
suppress {ji } and {p^} in describing equilibrium strategies for conciseness. Equilibria
in which wage offers are devoid of type information are called pooling equilibria, as
opposed to separating equilibria where wage offers are clear-cut signals of firm types.
Equilibria can also be classified according to the informational content of workers’
acceptance strategies, as shown in Table 1: screening for equilibria inducing differ-
ent, and nonscreening for equilibria inducing identical, acceptance choices. Note that
an outcome where one worker type withdraws from the market while the other type
accepts some offers is also a screening outcome. In addition to the four possible
combinations of types of equilibria, there may be hybrid, or semi-screening, equi-
libria in which differential acceptance decisions convey no information to one firm
14 This and several other assumptions in the article can be motivated by assuming a continuum of
firms and workers, and will hold approximately for large populations. There are potential measure-
theoretic problems in models with a continuum of agents, focusing on the behavior of subsets
(coalitions) of agents. See Hammond et al. (1989), for example. I follow Wolinsky (1990) in taking
several features as model primitives instead of going into the terse exercise of deriving them from a
model of continuum of agents.
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type whereas the other firm type is able to predict accurately the type of its appli-
cants. This can happen only if the firms’ equilibrium offers are ‘‘separating,’’ which
explains the empty cell at the top right of Table 1. A separating/nonscreening
equilibrium is also impossible because if the two firm types offer different wages, thus
separate, l-workers and h-workers cannot all be indifferent between the two offers
(whereas they should, in a nonscreening equilibrium where acceptance choices reveal
no type information). This explains the empty cell at the bottom left of Table 1.
I present below the equilibrium outcome under complete information (fully
observable characteristics). Assumption (A3) implies that only iÿ i matchings will
occur; therefore, in this benchmark case the market can be treated as consisting of
two submarkets. The Nash equilibrium of this game reproduces the competitive
equilibrium outcome.
PROPOSITION 1. A unique equilibrium exists under complete information.
H-firms offer wH  wh if pN  qM, and wH  RH(h) if pN < qM; these offers are
accepted by h-workers. L-firms offer wL  wl if (1ÿ p)N  (1ÿ q)M, and wL  RL(l)
if (1ÿ p)N < (1ÿ q)M; these offers are accepted by l-workers.
Consider the case pN  qM, which means that h-worker population exceeds H-firm
population. Ifw > wh were an equilibrium offer, it would be accepted by all h-workers
but a measure pN ÿ qM would nevertheless be unemployed. Anticipating this, any
H-firm could deviate to the offerwh, meet at least one worker with probability one, and
decrease its wage costs. This yieldswh as type-H firms’ unique equilibrium wage offer.
Similar arguments can be used to show that wH  RH(h) if pN < qM. Hence, efficient
matching is obtained under complete information and all the surplus in equilibrium
goes to agents belonging to the relatively smaller population.
3. UNOBSERVABLE CHARACTERISTICS ON BOTH SIDES
This section studies the matching game presented in Section 2 under incomplete
information. Throughout the analysis I assume N M; that is, worker population
is larger than firm population.15 Let N(H)  min{qM, pN} and N(L) 
min {(1ÿ q)M, (1ÿ p)N} represent employment in H- and L-sectors under efficient
matching. The maximum social surplus is
TABLE 1
CLASSIFICATION OF POTENTIAL MATCHING EQUILIBRIA
jl  jh jl 6 jh jl 6 jh
wH  wL Pooling/nonscreening Pooling/screening —
wH 6 wL — Separating/screening Separating/semiscreening
15 The analysis of the opposite case does not present any additional difficulty. I focus on the case
N M for conciseness of exposition and because I consider it to be more representative of most real-
world situations.
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Z  [RH(h)ÿ wh]N(H) [RL(l)ÿ wl]N(L)
consisting of the surpluses from H ÿ h and Lÿ l matching. The corresponding level
of aggregate unemployment is U  N ÿN(H)ÿN(L). The market outcome will be
inefficient whenever the actual equilibrium surplus, denoted ZE, is below Z
. This
happens if (i) some types withdraw from the market and/or (ii) matching of opposite
types occurs. The measure of inefficiency is therefore CE  Z ÿ ZE.
A few remarks on equilibrium matching outcomes and wage determination may
be useful at this stage. Relative proportions of H- to L-firms and h- to l-workers play
an important role in determining the type of equilibrium and matching. For instance,
a pooling wage offer is likely in markets populated predominantly by H-firms and
h-workers. The probability of an H ÿ l or Lÿ h matching being low, H-firms will not
find it beneficial to separate from L-firms that imitate them. Given the equilibrium
type, wages are determined by demand and supply considerations, that is, the firms’
probability of receiving at least one applicant (which depends on the proportion of
workers applying to their offer) and the expected type of the applicants. Bidding up
the wage slightly increases the number but cannot improve the expected quality of
applicants. Bidding down the wage may be beneficial if the firm does not expect a
sharp fall in the number of applicants, which depends on whether there is unem-
ployment at the actual wage and how the workers interpret a lower wage.
3.1. Pooling/Nonscreening (PN) Equilibria. I consider first equilibria in which
wages and acceptance decisions convey no type information. The set of type
distributions {p, q} for which a PN equilibrium exists is shown in Figure 1 by the
shaded area. A PN equilibrium exists in markets populated predominately by
H-firms and h-workers. Because N M and all firms offer the same wage wP
accepted by all workers, there will be unemployment, which bids down the
pooling wage until Eui(q, wP)  u for i  l and/or h. Thus, this pooling offer
yields all workers an expected utility equal to their outside surplus. In Figure 1,
the area to the northeast of the intersection of the schedules pH(wP) and pL(wP)
represents the set SPN of type distributions such that all firms at least break even
by offering the equilibrium wage.16 The firms have no incentive to bid up the
wage because they are already matched with at least one applicant and bidding up
the wage does not improve the quality of applicants. On the other hand, no firm
has an incentive to decrease its offer, for it would be interpreted as an L-firm.
One final condition that remains to be checked is that because there is unem-
ployment, an L-firm may consider offering a lower wage, signal its type, and
attract only l-workers. This will not happen, because the condition q > q implies
wP < wl: PN equilibrium wage is lower than the lowest wage that l-workers would
accept for employment in L-firms.
16 SPN consists of high q and p values because a high q (meaning the proportion of H-firms is
large) allows for a lower acceptable pooling wage offer (wP is decreasing in q) while a high p
(meaning the proportion of h-workers is large) implies that the firms can earn nonnegative expected
profits by attracting both types of workers.
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PROPOSITION 2. If {p, q} 2 SPN and q > q, a PN equilibrium exists where all
firms offer the same wage wP, which all workers accept. Both Lÿ h and H ÿ l
matchings occur; thus, a PN equilibrium displays all types of matching inefficiency.
No wage dispersion is observed in this equilibrium. A single wage clears the
market populated by two different types of workers and firms. Though all jobs are
filled and unemployment U  N ÿM is minimal, the PN equilibrium outcome
displays both types of matching inefficiency: a measure (1ÿ p)qM of H-firms are
matched with l-workers and a measure p(1ÿ q)M of L-firms are matched with
h-workers. For instance, in the case qM < pN and (1ÿ q)M < (1ÿ p)N (H- and
L-firm populations are smaller than the corresponding worker populations), the
measure of inefficiency will be
CPN  (1ÿ p)qM[RH(h)ÿ wh  wl ÿ RH(l)] p(1ÿ q)M[RL(l)ÿ wl  wh ÿ RL(h)]
which reflects the surplus that can be generated by dissolving matching of opposite
types and constructing the maximum number of proper matching. Inefficiency of PN
equilibrium vanishes as p! 1 and q! 1, that is, as firm and worker population
distributions homogenize toward the high-quality type.
FIGURE 1
RANGE OF POOLING/NONSCREENING EQUILIBRIA AS A FUNCTION OF FIRM AND WORKER
POPULATION DISTRIBUTIONS
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3.2. Separating/SemiScreening (SSS) Equilibria. An SSS equilibrium involves a
pair of distinct wage offers, one for each firm type. All workers accept the higher wage
offer and place it at the top of their acceptance lists; therefore, the higher wage offer
does no screening. By Assumption (A.3), L-firms cannot make a separating wage
offer accepted by all workers; therefore, the higher wage offer comes from H-firms.
L-firms make the low offer accepted by l-workers only (though ranked below the high
offer of H-firms). Since N M, H-firms cannot obviously hire the entire worker
population. Among those who have not been able to match with an H-firm, (residual)
workers of type-l apply to L-firms while (residual) h-workers withdraw from the
market. Two cases arise according to whether the size of L-firms exceeds or not the
size of these residual l-workers. In the affirmative, the wage in the L-sector is RL(l);
otherwise it is wl. H-firms’ offer is ‘‘separating’’ and higher, but equal to the lowest
offer that prevents L-firms’ imitation. H-firms take the risk of being matched with
l-workers because h-worker population (or p) is large enough (Figure 2).
PROPOSITION 3. (i) If p  max{pC1, (N ÿM)=(N ÿ qM)},17 the following strat-
egies form an SSS equilibrium: H-firms offer wH  pRL(h) (1ÿ p)RL(l) and
FIGURE 2
RANGE OF SEPARATING/SEMISCREENING EQUILIBRIA AS A FUNCTION OF FIRM AND
WORKER POPULATION DISTRIBUTIONS
17 The two critical beliefs pC1 and pC2 are defined in the Appendix.
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L-firms offer wL  RL(l). Any wage w  wH is interpreted as coming from an H-firm;
other wages are interpreted as an L-firm’s offer.
(ii) If pC2  p < (N ÿM)(N ÿ qM), the SSS equilibrium offers are wH  wl
 p[RL(h)ÿ RL(l)] for H-firms, and wL  wl for L-firms. Beliefs are as in (i).
An SSS equilibrium displays wage dispersion and signaling of a high-quality job
through wage premia if the high-quality worker population is large enough. The size
of this wage premium depends on market conditions in the L-sector; it is large if each
L-firm meets at least one l-worker, small otherwise. Inefficient matches occur
((1ÿ p)qM l-workers are matched with H-firms) and there is unemployment (of
measure p(N ÿ qM) if pN < qM, (1ÿ p)qM if pN  qM). The measure of ineffi-
ciency in an SSS equilibrium is
CSSS  (1ÿ p)qM(wl ÿ RH(l))X(RH(h)ÿ wh  Y(RL(l)ÿ wl)
where X  p(N ÿ qM) if pN < qM and X  (1ÿ p)qM otherwise, and Y represents
the potential surplus from establishing Lÿ l matches.18 As expected, the level of
inefficiency in an SSS equilibrium is lower than a PN equilibrium because in the
former, H-firms signal their type, which avoids Lÿ h matches. Thus, CSSS < CPN.
3.3. Pooling/Screening (PS) Equilibria. The matching game has a PS equi-
librium where workers respond differently to the pooling wage offer wP:
h-workers accept the offer while l-workers withdraw from the market.19 For
h-workers to accept a pooling offer and risk being matched with L-firms, the
proportion of H-firms must be high (stated as q > qC in Proposition 4). The PS
equilibrium wage is determined according to demand-and-supply considerations. If
total labor supply pN at the pooling wage exceeds the demand M (i.e., p M=N),
wP is relatively low. Otherwise w

P is high because firms will bid up the wage until
the offer hits the limit of attracting withdrawn l-workers. Above the locus LL in
Figure 3 L-firms have no incentive to bid up the wage (condition (2)). The region
of prior beliefs such that H-firms do not bid up that wage is given by the area to
the right of HH1 locus, or HH2 locus, depending on their equilibrium profit levels
(conditions in (3)). Define wi(q) through qui(wi(q), H) (1ÿ q)ui(wi(q), L)
ÿ wi(q)  u as the wage that makes i-workers indifferent between accepting the
wage wi(q) and taking their outside option, and qC through wl(qC)  wh(qC).
PROPOSITION 4. Assume q > qC. A PS equilibrium exists where only h-workers
accept wP  wl(q) if
RL(l)ÿ wl(q)
[RL(h)ÿ wl(q)]N=M ÿ [RL(h)ÿ RL(l)]
 p < M
N
(2)
18 Y  (1ÿp)qM if (1ÿp)N > (1ÿq)M and Y  (1ÿq)M ÿ (1ÿp)(N ÿ qM) if (1ÿ q)M > (1ÿ p)
N > (1ÿ p)(N ÿ qM). Otherwise Y  0.
19 The opposite case could not happen because by (A3) RH(l) < wl  wP: H-firms would not
make an offer that only l-workers accept.
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and either
M
N
 RH(h)ÿ wl(q)
RH(h)ÿ RH(l) or p 
wl(q)ÿ RH(l)
RH(h)ÿ RH(l)ÿ NM (RH(h)ÿ wl(q))
(3)
On the other hand, if p M=N, the PS equilibrium offer is wP  wh(q).
This equilibrium shows that a single wage can prevail in job markets populated
predominantly by high-quality firms and workers, and the equilibrium wage could be
low enough to drive low-quality workers to their outside option. Though l-workers
withdraw, they constitute a small fraction of the worker population. For pN < M, a
measure pqN of H ÿ h matching and a measure (1ÿ q)pN of Lÿ l matching occur.
The measure of inefficiency is therefore
CPS  (1ÿ q)pN(wh ÿ RL(h)) (RH(h)ÿ wh)min{q(M ÿ pN), (1ÿ q)pN}
 (RL(l)ÿ wl)min{(1ÿ q)M, (1ÿ p)N}
This consists of the negative surplus from Lÿ h matching, plus the foregone sur-
pluses that could be obtained by properly matching mismatched h-workers and
withdrawn l-workers.
3.4. Separating/Screening (SS) Equilibria. The last possible matching out-
come involves full revelation of type information, either through strategies that
FIGURE 3
RANGE OF POOLING/SCREENING EQUILIBRIA AS A FUNCTION OF FIRM AND WORKER
POPULATION DISTRIBUTIONS
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(potentially) lead to a matching or simply through withdrawals from the market.
I consider first SS equilibria in which both types of firms and workers
operate, consisting of distinct wage offers {wL, w

H} from the two firm types.
Now, since matching in an SS equilibrium occurs under perfect information,
wL  wl and wH  wh. l-Workers must reject H-firms’ offer (wH < wL) and
firms must earn nonnegative profits: RH(h)ÿ wH  0 and RL(l)ÿ wL  0. Combin-
ing these conditions implies that wL 2 [wl, RL(l)] and wH 2 [wh, wL]. Note that
an H-firm never imitates the higher wage offer of an L-firm. An imitation in
the opposite direction is possible, but ruled out under the conditions given in
Proposition 5. Note that perfect matching is obtained; hence an SS equilibrium
is efficient.
As shown in Figure 4, an SS equilibrium exists if p is sufficiently lower than q and
if M=N is close to one (stated as (4) in Proposition 5). The relatively low wage
offered by H-firms is not imitated by an L-firm thanks to a low probability of
meeting an h-worker, which implies a low p=q ratio. This, combined with a ratio
M=N sufficiently close to one, implies that l-worker population exceeds L-firm
population; hence, L-firms meet an l-worker with probability one. Note that the SS
equilibrium produces the efficient outcome.
FIGURE 4
RANGE OF SEPARATING/SCREENING EQUILIBRIA AS A FUNCTION OF FIRM AND WORKER
POPULATION DISTRIBUTIONS
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PROPOSITION 5. If
p  qM
N
RL(l)ÿ wl
RL(h)ÿ wl
 
(4)
and if either
q <
N
M
 
RH(h)ÿ wl
RH(h)ÿ RH(l)
 
or p  wl ÿ RH(l)
RH(h)ÿ RH(l)ÿ (N=qM)[RH(h)ÿ wl]
(5)
an SS equilibrium exists where H-firms offer wH  wl, which is accepted by h-workers,
and L-firms offer wL  wl, which only l-workers accept.
Consider now the second type of SS equilibrium where only one firm type and one
worker type operate. These cannot be H-firms and h-workers because L-firms and/or
l-workers would enter the market rather than withdraw. An SS equilibrium in which
only Lÿ l matching occurs may exist if l-worker population is sufficiently large and if
workers hold ‘‘pessimistic’’ beliefs: a wage offer is interpreted as an L-firm’s offer
unless it exceeds RL(h), the productivity of h-workers in L-firms. The equilibrium
outcome generates Gresham’s Law in the labor market: H-firms and h-workers
withdraw. The wage offer of L-firms may take on two values, determining how the
surplus from Lÿ l matching is shared. The social cost of having H-firms withdrawn
from the market is CSSL  (RH(h)ÿ wh) min{qM, pN}, which vanishes as either
q! 0 or p! 0.
PROPOSITION 6. Two types of SS equilibria exist where only L-firms and
l-workers operate. If q  1ÿ (1ÿ p)N=M and
p  RL(h)ÿ RH(l)
RH(h)ÿ RH(l)(6)
L-firms offer wL  RL(l). If q > 1ÿ (1ÿ p)N=M and (6) holds, L-firms offer wL 
wl. These offers are accepted by l-workers. H-firms do not make any offer or make a
ridiculous offer rejected by all workers.
4. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
This article investigates the role wage offers can play in signaling and extracting
information about unobservable firm and worker characteristics in a large job
market. It considers a market matching game with two types of firms and workers:
one that has desirable qualities and another with poor, undesirable qualities. Effi-
ciency requires matching firms and workers of the same type. In the model, firms
announce wages, workers make applications, and matching occurs. The article shows
that when firms and workers are incompletely informed about each others’ charac-
teristics, a rich class of wage patterns and matching outcomes can arise, depending on
the fraction of firms and workers with desirable attributes, the size of excess supply
of labor (as captured by N=M), and matching preferences of firm and worker types. I
summarize below the results and discuss their implications with reference to the
literature, followed by some extensions.
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(i) Markets with a large population of ‘‘high-quality’’ workers have an SSS
equilibrium in which wages signal firm characteristics but job applications do not
signal worker types. This is the only outcome if, in addition, the population of low-
quality firms is sufficiently large. Better jobs offer a higher but nonscreening wage
that attracts all workers. Low-quality workers who have not been able to get a good
job apply to the lower wage offered by low-quality jobs, while high-quality workers
who do not find a high-quality match remain unemployed. This equilibrium outcome
is supported by ‘‘pessimistic’’ but plausible beliefs, in that wages lower than high-
quality firms’ equilibrium offer are interpreted as coming from low-quality firms.
The equilibrium wage offer of high-quality firms is higher than under complete
information; hence, workers who match with them receive a ‘‘wage premium.’’ The
theoretical literature provides several explanations for why profit-maximizing firms
would pay wages above opportunity costs of workers. Weiss’ (1990) explanation is
based on the premise that higher wages per se increase output. He shows that the
matching market populated by identical firms and heterogeneous workers with
unobserved qualities and reservation wages has a complete sorting equilibrium
where higher-ability workers match with firms offering higher wages. Shirking
models (e.g., Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) stress the fact that in many jobs it is pro-
hibitively costly to write and enforce complete contracts that could induce efficient
performance; hence, firms pay above market wages and rely on the threat of firing
poorly performing workers. Firms may also be paying premia to reduce turnover
(e.g., Salop, 1979) or prevent unionization (Dickens, 1986). I show that a higher wage
may be used as a signal of desirable firm characteristics when the signal is not
too costly, that is, if the proportion of workers with desirable characteristics is
sufficiently large.
(ii) Markets with a large proportion of high-quality firms to low-quality workers
have an SS equilibrium where wages signal firm quality and screen worker types.
Perfect matching occurs despite the information problem. The wage structure is the
opposite of (i), hence accords with the prediction of the theory of compensating
differences: less attractive jobs pay a premium. This outcome arises here from sig-
naling and screening considerations, rather than through self-selection of heteroge-
neous but informed workers who weigh wages against job attributes. Compensating
differentials may be paid even if the differences in question are not observable but
have to be experienced.
(iii) If the low-quality worker population is sufficiently large, high-quality firms
may withdraw from the market. The intuition is straightforward: ‘‘lemons’’ dominate
the market and drive high-quality firms and workers to their outside options. Note
that the range of parameters (preponderance of low-quality types) generating this
outcome in part intersects with the outcome in (ii).
(iv) Three types of equilibria coexist in a market dominated by high-quality firms
and workers. The first is the SSS equilibrium described in (i). Second, there is a PN
equilibrium in which strategies are devoid of type information: all firms offer the
same wage, accepted by all workers. Thus, a single wage prevails in this market
populated by observationally identical but heterogeneous firms and workers. The
third is a PS equilibrium in which all firms offer the same wage, accepted only by
high-quality workers. The likelihood of this outcome decreases as worker and firm
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populations become equal in size. The PS equilibrium differs from PN in that poor-
quality workers (who constitute a small fraction of the worker population) withdraw
from the market.20 Both equilibria are supported by plausible beliefs. The main
intuition behind a pooling wage offer is that signaling desirable job attributes is not
worth the cost given workers’ beliefs and preponderance of high-quality workers.21
I close the article with possible extensions of the model. Introducing observable
characteristics correlated with unobservables appears to have a predictable impact.
The case for signaling and screening will become stronger and wage offers will
become more firm- and worker-specific as the correlation increases. Though firms
will be able to discriminate between cohorts of workers and vice versa, workers and
firms of a given cohort will be indistinguishable; therefore, the present analysis
remains relevant.22
I assumed costless search to focus exclusively on information revelation in the
simplest way. Introducing a friction in the form of search costs will complicate the
workers’ problem. Each worker will then have to anticipate the number of applicants
and trade off wages against acceptance probabilities. Introducing time dynamics is
the most important and interesting extension despite the potential problem of
multiple equilibria.23 In a multiperiod version of the present model, new firms and
workers with unknown characteristics would join the market in each period, affecting
the distribution of unattached workers and vacancies, hence the evolution of equi-
librium wage offers. Wolinsky’s (1990) model of information revelation through
pairwise meetings is relevant here. This extension would also allow one to address
important issues such as job creation and destruction.
1APPENDIX
A.1. Conditions on Out-of-Equilibrium Beliefs. Formal statements of the two
conditions imposed on equilibria, explained at the end of Section 2, are given below
in order.
20 Since they produce different matching outcomes, SSS, PN, and PS equilibria exhibit different
degrees of inefficiency. An SSS equilibrium is more efficient compared to PN because it involves one
less type of inefficiency, the one that stems from H ÿ l matching. The comparison between PN and
PS is not that clear, however. While PS has the advantage of avoiding H ÿ l matching, it has the
disadvantage of eliminating the surplus that could be generated by matching low-quality firms with
withdrawn low-quality workers.
21 Kuhn (1994) provides an alternative explanation for pooling contract offers, based on risk-
averse and homogeneous workers’ need for insurance against revelation of firm types or private
information that affects workers’ utilities.
22 On the other hand, with more than two types of workers and firms, the number of equilibria
would obviously be larger: a subset of firms may offer a pooling wage while another subset separates
through different wage offers; some types of workers may have identical acceptance strategies while
others signal their types or withdraw. The analysis of this general case in the present model would no
doubt be considerably more complex. See Sattinger (1995) for a different approach to the matching
problem with many types of workers and firms.
23 In a two-period, one-sided incomplete information model, Laing (1993) studies the feedback
from wages that signal worker abilities to job applications in the beginning of workers’ careers. A
similar effect would be observed in an equilibrium of a two-period extension of the present model.
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(B1) Consider a vector of equilibrium wage offers {w} and a corresponding vector
of profits {v}. For any w0 j2 {w}, construct the set of firm types F(w0) such that a
firm of type m 2 F(w) has equilibrium profits vm no less than any profits it can
obtain in equilibria of the continuation game following its deviation to w0. For any
firm type j j2F(w0), let q^j  0 if j  L and q^j  1 if j  H given the wage offer w0. If
vj < vj(w0, q^j), then {w
} cannot be an equilibrium vector of offers.
(B2) Let w be an offer made in an equilibrium by a set F of firms, with expected
profits v and updated beliefs q^ at w: Suppose that vm(wm  ) > v for some firm
m 2 F and  > 0 arbitrarily small, given workers’ best replies to w   with beliefs
constant at q^: Then, w is not an equilibrium offer.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2. The proof first defines the set of wages that both
worker types would accept, as a function of q. Next it defines the set of prior beliefs
such that all firms earn nonnegative expected profits in a PN equilibrium. Last, it
verifies that no deviation will occur from the prescribed strategies. I postulate beliefs
for out-of-equilibrium offers as q^  0 for w < wP, q^  q for w 2 [wP, RL(h)) and
q^  1 for w  RL(h), where wP is determined below. Note that q^  q and p^  p in a
PN equilibrium because strategies do not convey any type information.
To be accepted, the pooling offer wP must satisfy the participation constraints of
all workers:
Ui(q, wP)  qui(wP, H) (1ÿ q)ui(wP, L)  u(A:1)
Given q, let wi(q) be the wage that makes condition (A.1) binding for at least
one i  l, h. Also, define wP(q)  max{wl(q), wh(q)} as the lowest wage that satis-
fies the participation constraints of both worker types. The assumption (A2) on
the ranking of utilities, combined with (A.1), reveals that as q! 1,
Uh(q, wP) > Ul(q, wP). Therefore, wl(q) > wh(q); hence wP(q)  wl(q), for q close
enough to one. Recall that by definition, wl(q)! wl as q! 1. On the other hand,
as q approaches zero, Uh(q, wP) < Ul(q, wP), thus wl(q) < wh(q), and
wP(q)  wh(q). By definition, wh(q)! wh as q! 0. Since ui(:, j) is a continuous
function of w, wP(q) decreases continuously in q in the range [wl, wh]. We define a
lower bound q for q through
wP(q)  wh(q)  wl
If q > q, l-workers would reject the wage wP(q) offered by L-firms (provided they
infer the firm type) because wP(q) is lower than the minimum wage they would
accept to work in a type-L firm.
I construct below the set of prior beliefs (p, q), denoted SPN, such that all market
participants expect a nonnegative payoff given the pooling wage offer wP(q). To
this end, for any w and j  L, H, define the function pj(w) through the zero-profit
condition
pj(w)Rj(h) (1ÿ p(w))Rj(l)ÿ w  0(A:2)
The function pj(w) is decreasing in w. The boundary of the set SPN can be obtained
by substituting for w in (A.2) the lowest (pooling) wage accepted by both types,
wP(q).
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To see the behavior of the functions pH(w) and pL(w), let q! 1 and consider
(A.2) for j  H. Using wP(1)  wl in (A.2) reveals that pH(wP(1))  pH(wl) 2 (0, 1)
(because RH(l) < wl but RH(h) > wl, such a number pH(wl) strictly between zero and
one must exist). Consider (A.2) for j  L, as q! 1. Now, pL(wP(1))  pL(wl) < 0
because from (A3) wl < wl < RL(l) < RL(h). On the other hand, as q approaches
zero, wP(q) approaches wP(0)  wh, which, used in (A.2), yields pH(wh) < 1 and
pL(wh) > 1 (i.e., pH(wP(0)) < 1 and pL(wP(0)) > 1). Now define SPN  {(p, q)j
(p, q) 2 (0, 1)2, p  pj(wP(q)), j  L, H}.
To complete the proof, I show below that if p  pi(wP) and q > q, then wP  wP(q)
is a PN equilibrium wage offer. Workers accept the offer wP for it yields them a
nonnegative expected surplus, by satisfying their participation constraints in (A.1).
However, N ÿM workers will be involuntarily unemployed. A slightly lower wage
offer will be rejected by h-workers because beliefs are then revised to q^  0.
l-Workers, too, will reject a lower offer because the condition q > q implies wP < wl
(accepting such an offer yields a negative payoff). Since N > M, a  1; hence the
firms have no incentive to offer a higher wage. In particular, H-firms gain nothing by
signaling their type via the high offer w  RL(h). Finally, the condition (p, q) 2 SPN
ensures that all market participants obtain a nonnegative expected payoff. j
A.3. Proof of Proposition 3. As a first step, I define two critical prior beliefs pC1
and pC2 as follows: If p  pC1, an H-firm’s expected profit from making a non-
screening offer (accepted by all and ranked at top) is higher than an L-firm’s
corresponding expected profit. This condition yields
pC1  RL(l)ÿ RH(l)
RL(l)ÿ RH(l) RH(h)ÿ RL(h)
The expression defining pC2 is obtained by substituting wl for RL(l) in the numerator
of the expression defining pC1 above. The level of pC2 is such that the nonscreening
wage wl  pC2[RL(h)ÿ RL(l)] yields a zero profit to H-firms. Note that pC2 < pC1
because wl < RL(l).
24 Out-of-equilibrium beliefs are specified as q^  1 if w  wH ,
and q^  0 otherwise.
(i) The equilibrium offer wL  RL(l) yields L-firms zero profits. L-firms will not
deviate to w  wH because though this offer would be interpreted as coming from an
H-firm, it can only yield nonpositive expected profits. To see that wL  RL(l) is the
only possible equilibrium offer of L-firms, note that the condition
p > (N ÿM)=(N ÿ qM) ensures that L-firm population exceeds l-worker population
who is not able to meet an H-firm, therefore, that Lÿ l matching occurs with
probability less than one. Consequently, wL < RL(l) cannot be an SSS equilibrium
offer of L-firms because any L-firm would unilaterally deviate to wL   and increase
its probability of meeting an l-worker to one. As for H-firms, the condition p  pC1
ensures that each obtains a nonnegative expected profit, by definition of pC1.
H-firms’ offer is optimal given the belief systems because offering w > wH only
24 This follows from Assumption (A.3), which states that the surplus from Lÿ l matching is
positive.
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increases the wage bill leaving the expected applicant type constant, while an offer
w < wH is interpreted as coming from an L-firm, hence generating negative profits.
Finally, workers’ application strategies are clearly optimal.
(ii) In this case, L-firms’ equilibrium profit is RL(l)ÿ wl > 0 and just equal to what
each expects by unilaterally deviating to H-firms’ offer wH . The condition
p  (N ÿM)=(N ÿ qM) implies that at any wL 2 [wL, RL(l)] an L-firm meets an
l-worker with probability one. This implies that a wage wL > wl cannot be an SSS
equilibrium offer of L-firms. H-firms obtain nonnegative profits by condition
p  pC2. As in case (i), H-firms’ equilibrium offer is the lowest separating and
nonscreening wage offer. j
A.4. Proof of Proposition 4. First, define a critical belief qC through the con-
dition qCui(wP(qC), H) (1ÿ qC)ui(wP(qC), L)  u, i  l, h, which implies wP(qC)
 wl(qC)  wh(qC) (see also condition (A.1) in the proof of Proposition 2): the
pooling wage wP(qC) yields both worker types the expected utility u. Recall that for
q > qC( > q), wh(q) < wl(q). Beliefs for out-of-equilibrium wage offers are specified
as follows: q^  q for w < RL(h), and q^  1 for w  RL(h).
For any q > qC, w

P must belong to the interval (wh(q), wl(q)]. Consider any wP
from this interval. The expected profit of a type-j firm is a(Rj(h)ÿ wP) where a  1 if
pN M. The wage wP  wh(q) is therefore a PS equilibrium offer: a deviation to
w > wh(q) only increases the wage bill (note that beliefs at the right neighborhood of
wP satisfy (B2)), whereas a deviation to w < wh(q) is interpreted as coming from
L-firms. Thus, H-firms will not deviate, nor will L-firms because q > qC > q implies
wP < wl (see the proof of Proposition 2).
Consider now the case pN < M, hence a < 1. The profit a(Rj(h)ÿ wP) is positive
because wP  wl(q) < wl < RL(h) < RH(h). A wage wP < wl(q) cannot be a PS
equilibrium offer because deviating to a wage wP   < wl(q), which by (B2) should
leave beliefs unchanged, will increase a to one. To see that no deviation from
wP  wl(q) will occur given beliefs off the equilibrium path, consider first H-firms:
deviating to a lower wage decreases profits to zero, while deviating to a wP   is not
beneficial if
pN
M
[RH(h)ÿ wl(q)]  pRH(h) (1ÿ p)RH(l)ÿ wl(q)ÿ (A:3)
which as ! 0, holds for
p  RH(l)ÿ wl(q)
RH(h)(N=M ÿ 1) RH(l)ÿ (N=M)wl(q)(A:4)
The first condition stated in (3) implies that the denominator of the expression in
(A.4) is positive; hence, the right-hand side of (A.4) becomes negative because
RL(l) < wl(q). If the denominator in (A.4) is negative, that is, if the first condition in
(3) is false, the inequality in (A.4) must be reversed, which corresponds to the second
condition given in (3). Consider now L-firms. As mentioned above, q > qC > q
ensures that an L-firm will not deviate to a lower offer. Deviating to wl(q) , on the
other hand, yields pRL(h) (1ÿ p)RL(l)ÿ wl(q)ÿ . This is not beneficial, because
letting ! 0,
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p  RL(l)ÿ wl(q)
[RL(h)ÿ wl(q)](N=M)ÿ [RL(h)ÿ RL(l)]
as stated in (2). Note that the belief systems are consistent with the strategies. The
proof is complete. j
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5. Specify out-of-equilibrium beliefs as q^  1 for
w  wl and w  RL(h), and q^  0 for w 2 (wl, RL(h)). According to the strategies
described in the proposition, an L-firm’s equilibrium profit is RL(l)ÿ wl. Condition
(4) ensures that L-firms will not deviate to any w  wl. As for out-of-equilibrium
offers, an H-firm obtains pRH(h) (1ÿ p)RH(l)ÿ wl ÿ  if it deviates to wl  
where, by (B2), q^  1 for  arbitrarily small. But this deviation merely decreases
expected profits below the equilibrium profit [(pN)=(qM)][RH(h)ÿ wl] under either
condition given in (5). j
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6. All L-firms obtain zero profit in the first equilib-
rium. Since by the condition q  1ÿ (1ÿ p)N=M L-firm population is larger than
l-worker population, competition bids the wage up to wL  RL(l). An offer above
RL(l) yields negative profits whereas lower offers are rejected by all. Given beliefs
q^  0 for w < RL(h), an H-firm can offer RL(h), signal its type, and attract all
workers. However, this yields the expected profit pRH(h) (1ÿ p)RH(l)ÿ RL(h),
which is nonpositive because p satisfies (6). In the second SS equilibrium, the
condition q > 1ÿ 1ÿ p)N=M ensures that a unilateral deviation by an L-firm to a
lower wage wL is beneficial for all wL > wl. L-firms’ equilibrium offer is therefore
wL  wl. j
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